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Abstract  
The apparent, if uncertain, rejection of neoliberalism manifested by the election of Donald Trump in 
the US (alongside the slim, but clear majority for Brexit in the UK, and a growing racist and 
protectionist nationalism across Europe) necessitates renewed analysis of the future of both 
promises of technical fixes to climate change, such as carbon capture and storage (CCS), carbon 
dioxide removal (CDR) and solar radiation management (SRM) (in this chapter collectively referred to 
as climate engineering), and the potential future hegemonic political regimes that may replace 
neoliberalism. Drawing on a cultural political economy analysis of the co-evolution of political 
regimes and promises of technical fixes to climate change (Markusson et al. 2017), we here discuss 
what the current moment of radical destabilisation might augur. The election of Trump indicates a 
potential unsettling of an established dynamic whereby promises of technical fixes to climate change 
co-evolved with, and imperfectly supported, the neoliberal power regime and its preferred market-
based solutions to the climate change problem. We identify two key and interacting dialectics, 
between neoliberalism and illiberalism, and between continued neoliberal (but illiberally challenged) 
US hegemony and budding China-centred liberalism 2.0. Both these dialectics appear conducive to 
prolonged attention to the promise of climate engineering, as talk and research, or even as limited 
deployment. 
 
1. Introduction  
The political landscape surrounding issues of climate engineering is currently changing fast with the 
rise of new nationalist populism across the US and Europe. What do these latest developments 
suggest for the future envisioning, development and deployment of climate engineering? How could 
this technology develop in interactive parallel with a changing political regime? And how can 
systematic speculation about such futures help us understand the current political turbulence? 
In characteristically incoherent fashion (though aligned with other deniers), the recently elected US 
president Donald Trump has both denied the existence of anthropogenic climate change, and lauded 
‘clean coal’ technology as a means of ensuring continued coal use (Clouse 2016, Schwartz 2017, 
Faber et al 2017). This position is confusing in its own right. But its implications for climate policy 
framing and strategy are also unclear. On the one hand, it could be seen as a good fit with the 
established pattern of neoliberal climate change policy. Neoliberal climate policy has been 
characterised by reliance on emissions markets, and shored up by promises of climate engineering 
technology: technical fixes to climate change, primarily carbon capture and storage (CCS), and also 
more recently explicit climate engineering through carbon dioxide removal (CDR), and, though less 
so, solar radiation management (SRM). To date, climate policy in the neoliberal regime has only 
developed weakly-performing emissions markets that do not threaten fossil-dependent industry, nor 
implementation of climate engineering technology (Markusson et al 2017). Marketizing the 
atmosphere through emissions trading has been the quintessential neoliberal stance (Lohmann 
2012; Quiggin et al, 2014) and entailed an ambiguous position that superficially acknowledges 
climate change as an object worthy of a policy response, whilst at the same time denying its reality 
as a systemic crisis. In this sense, the particularities of Trump’s incoherence are merely an extension 
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and enhancement of a longstanding and deeply sedimented neoliberal tension in the climate policy 
arena. 
But there may be a more fundamental shift on the horizon. Trump has also departed from key 
neoliberal policies in the form of cancelled trade deals, and even evoked fears that his ascendancy 
represents a resurgent illiberalism (see e.g. McDougall 2016), e.g. through his challenges to the 
judiciary in the context of immigration policy, and in his open nepotism giving prominent positions 
to family members in the administration. Trump has not (yet, at least) mentioned climate 
engineering, but there are prominent people in his administration that are long-term supporters of 
such technology (Lukacs 2017, Bajak 2018). This potential of the Trump administration to look 
favourably toward climate engineering resonates with warnings of inherent illiberalism of some SRM 
type technologies (Macnaghten and Szerszynski 2013). 
Trump is now the elected leader of the hegemonic country of the current world order. But his 
election should also be seen, together with Brexit in the UK and a growing European racist populist 
nationalism, as indicative of a direct challenge to neoliberal globalisation from across the global 
North, as well as of the (longer process of) decline of US hegemony (Wallerstein 2003). In all these 
respects, these seemingly epochal developments can also be seen as the products of neoliberalism 
itself – its bastard offspring – as, of course, is Trump himself, the asset-stripping property magnate 
and agnotological post-truth, social media-trolling celebrity, as archetype and epitome. Trump is 
thus a continuation of neoliberalism but also entirely dependent on wide-spread re-action against 
neoliberal globalisation, and so embodies the turbulence of political economic epochal change, 
signifying the transition to a new regime. Such a shift of the tectonic plates of the political economy 
must surely also have profound impacts on – or rather co-evolve tightly with – the future of the 
development of a technological intervention as politically controversial and consequential as climate 
engineering (Keith 2017). Under this new and dynamic regime, the promises of technical fixes to 
climate change in the form of climate engineering (CCS, CDR and even now SRM) are being 
renegotiated.  
We are, it seems, living through a time of systemic turbulence, when dialectical tensions are 
erupting and becoming manifest at accelerated pace. At the level of transformations in the political 
economic regime dominating global society (and so, for the time being, global capitalism), we see 
two such overlapping and interacting dialectics playing out in the late 2010s. The first of these 
concerns precisely the creative destructive interplay of a still-dominant, if non-dead (cf. Crouch 
2011), neoliberalism and the rise of its illiberal progeny, fuelled precisely by the increasingly self-
destructive dysfunction of the former. This is a development equivalent, but crucially different in 
substance, to the global conflict of a failing British imperial liberalism and the rise of fascism in the 
1920s and ‘30s (cf. Fuchs 2017).  
In the US, at the heart of the disintegrating neoliberal world order, neoliberal certainties, such as the 
infallibility of ‘the market’ that were previously politically radical and strategically effective precisely 
as such, are increasingly trapped in a double bind whereby they are either without opposition from 
‘serious’ opinion and/or have lost popular credibility, in particular as proposed solutions to the key 
issues of the day, including economic stagnation and underemployment. The politically radical 
dynamism of neoliberalism, upon which that regime is founded, is thus neutralized, and even 
rendered to seem inadequately radical, especially as it is challenged by bold illiberal actions (even as 
these are themselves sometimes reined back in). This is evident in the climate policy arena, where 
Obama-era commitments to climate mitigation and the UNFCCC Paris Agreement have been 
dismissed with a roll-back of power sector emissions regulation (The Clean Power Plan) and 
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, while climate denialism has been bolstered and 
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mainstreamed (Smith 2017, Volcivici et al. 2017). A particular form of stable (if arguably stagnant) 
policy, based on an entrenched, if contested, mix of economic dogma, climate science and promises 
of technical fixes, has been juxtaposed with the instability of rash political gambits, disregard for 
science and heated controversy.  
Disparate articulations of the future of CCS and climate engineering are part of this dynamic. In the 
spring of 2017, op-eds in The Guardian speculated about whether the Trump administration’s roll 
back of climate policy will make climate engineering seem more urgent, whether Trump may come 
out in favour of climate engineering (rather than opt for full-on denialism), and whether climate 
engineering researchers would accept the Trump administration’s support given its links to climate 
denialism (Lukacs 2017, Keith and Wagner 2017). All of this, however, points to the second dialectic: 
namely regarding the damage done by all this domestic political transformation in the US to its 
global domination, and the possible rise in its place of a new polity at the centre of 21st century 
capitalism, the only viable candidate being China. Again, of course, this second dynamic has parallels 
in the 1930s, concerning the decline of the Pax Britannica and the ascendancy of a (reluctant, at time 
isolationist) American hegemon. We discuss this second dynamic below in terms of the still-
embryonic exploration of climate engineering in China, there under very different political and socio-
cultural circumstances and approaches to those pursued to date in what has been an 
overwhelmingly Euro-American debate.  
This chapter thus aims to analyse the current moment of turbulence, with regard to the ongoing co-
evolution of the (geo-)political regime and the deployment potential of climate engineering as 
supposed technical fixes for global climate change. Informed by previous analysis of the cultural 
political economy of promises of technical fix to climate change (Markusson et al 2017), we will here 
discuss possible co-evolutions of the political regime (neoliberal, illiberal and other scenarios) with 
climate engineering technology. We will also discuss the current dialectic between the lingering 
neoliberal regime and the illiberal upstart, and between continued neoliberal US hegemony and the 
rise of an alternative China-centred regime, and how the promise of climate engineering is 
implicated in these dialectics. We are here concerned with how best to understand the 
‘contemporary hinge’ (cf. Ryghaug and Moe Skjolsvold 2010) between the past of a neoliberal 
regime shored up by climate engineering promises, and multiple potential futures of the political 
regime co-evolving with climate engineering. 
 
2. The cultural political economy of promises of technical fixes to the climate change problem  
In previous work, we developed a cultural political economy framework to analyse promises of 
technical fixes to the climate change problem (Markusson et al 2017). We argue that the dominant 
neoliberal regime resulted in a persistent non-implementation of CCS, CDR and SRM. We analyse 
how technology, both as rhetorical promises and as substantial development and deployment, co-
evolves (non-deterministically) with political regimes. Promises of new technology may justify new 
spatio-temporal fixes for capital to invest in and hence new industries that can underpin political 
regimes. In turn, political regimes may favour the kinds of technology that can support their 
underpinning industries. As long as a contingent and emergent cycle of positive reinforcement can 
be maintained, technology and political regimes can co-evolve in a mutually supporting, dynamically 
stable pattern of interaction.  
Moreover, we distinguish between ordinary and defensive spatio-temporal fixes, where the latter’s 
main benefit is one of defending the former in the face of threats. For example, whilst CCS 
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technology has some potential to generate profit and growth in its own right, it is more important 
economically in its potential to defend existing and future fossil fuel based operations across a range 
of industries in the face of the climate mitigation imperative. It is in this sense a defensive spatio-
temporal fix, and the promise of CCS technology is the promise of a technical fix to the climate 
change problem while leaving existing socio-technical and political economic energy systems 
substantially intact. 
A large and ever-growing literature has detailed how the history of roughly the past four decades, up 
to and possibly including the new age of Trump, has been dominated by a neoliberal political regime. 
By this we mean a political regime that is at its core an epistemic project, organised around a belief 
in the unlimited capacity of markets to determine the optimal allocation of all things, including 
societal attention to ecological and other problems, and the conceptual prioritization of policies that 
support economic growth and overcome barriers to growth (Mirowski 2013). These neoliberal 
commitments have impacted on how knowledge production is organised and how it shapes social 
change. Specifically, the neoliberal regime has favoured short-term financial profit making over long-
term infrastructure investment, privately appropriable profits over public goods and opportunistic, 
venturesome exploitation of (possibly existing) assets over innovation of radical new technologies 
(Tyfield 2016). The neoliberal regime has thus engendered a reorganizing of society, technology and 
industry and the creation of new winners and losers that has empowered ideological cheerleaders 
that then support further neoliberal policies, thus setting up positive feedback loops.  
Moreover, the neoliberal regime, with its commitment to limitless markets and unlimited growth, 
propagates an illusion of resource inexhaustibility, as exemplified by the economics of oil (Mitchell 
2011). In dealing with climate change as a problem, and potential barrier to continued economic 
growth, the neoliberal regime has unsurprisingly turned to economic instruments in the first 
instance, with emissions trading as the emblematic policy instrument. This has then been married 
with the promise of CCS technology, which helped fossil-fuel invested climate deniers acknowledge 
climate change and envision a future of both continued fossil fuel use and climate mitigation 
(Stephens 2014, 2015). The promise of CCS, therefore, has perpetuated the neoliberal political 
economy regime, which underlies the ever-more pressing climate change imperative (Markusson et 
al 2017). Moreover, within the neoliberal political regime which promoted CCS in the 1990s and 
2000s, the CCS promise helped to make economic instruments like carbon taxes or carbon trading 
palatable to countries in the Global North whose climate ambitions clashed with dependence on 
fossil fuel extraction, e.g. the US and Norway (Stephens 2009). Internationally, the outcome of this 
process is that neoliberal climate policy has by and large failed, and has had limited impact on 
industry generally, and on CCS investment specifically. Emissions trading schemes have either not 
been introduced, or been allowed to generate prices too low to reduce emissions meaningfully. 
Reiterating the promise of CCS, while supporting limited research, has been more palatable to 
governments around the world than actually investing in expensive CCS demonstration plants 
(Markusson et al 2011). The simultaneous ongoing failure of the neoliberal regime to implement 
more than a few CCS facilities and continued reliance on the promise of CCS in climate modelling, 
shows that the CCS promise has worked to support the regime precisely and only by remaining a 
promise (Markusson et al. 2017). Significant public investment in innovation and infrastructure 
would run directly counter to the policy prescriptions of CCS’s most powerful, i.e. neoliberal, 
supporters.  
It is within this neoliberal context that the practical and imaginary conceptualization of climate 
engineering strategies have emerged. The trajectory of CDR appears to be following in the footsteps 
of CCS. As the CCS promise turned into disappointment (Shackley and Evar 2012; Martínez Arranz 
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2016), and the climate change crisis worsened, the policy gaze has turned to CDR technology, 
especially bioenergy with CCS (BECCS). Like CCS, CDR is now positioned as a promise of a technical fix 
to align climate mitigation with economic growth, by (like CCS before it) allowing the construction of 
scenarios with limited warming alongside continued fossil fuel use that is largely unchanged. CDR 
has thus emerged as (for now at least) a fresh neoliberal technical fix promise that has yet to be 
checked by experience of (a lack of) implementation, and as such is valuable to the regime. Like CCS, 
it may be most valuable to the regime as a promise, and that does not bode well for CDR 
development and implementation, but rather suggests a repeat of the CCS interlude.  
In contrast, the promise of SRM has not aligned well with the neoliberal regime. SRM has been 
depicted in high-profile reports as beyond the pale, and surprisingly unfit for inclusion in market-
based policy solutions (Royal Society 2009; IPCC 2014). It has been presented as both physically 
dangerous, with unpredictable, potentially disastrous side-effects on the climate system, and 
politically problematic (indeed illiberal) in that it may require globally centralised decision making 
that would be hard to check democratically. It has thus served to signpost a limit to acceptable 
neoliberal technical fixes, and so also as a threat of what transgressions necessarily await if we don’t 
support and implement the acceptable fixes. But, when relegated to being an external disciplining 
force, the promise of SRM has also challenged the foundational neoliberal belief in the unlimited 
ability of markets (and market instruments) to overcome barriers of change. For the very proffering 
of a distinction between such acceptable and unacceptable technologies is precisely to concede the 
independent existence of ‘limits’; a profoundly destabilizing eventuality for neoliberalism as a whole. 
The dynamic of the neoliberal regime, which admits no obstacles or constraints and revels in its 
destruction of ‘sacred cows’, unfolding with repeated promises of technical fixes for climate 
mitigation thus seems to have met a real – and so, as such, potentially fatal – stumbling block. That 
said, SRM could yet be embraced by neoliberalism as an extreme state intervention necessary to 
make market solutions to climate change work. If this happened, we might then envision the 
introduction, in turn, of competition and privatisation, to extract whatever rents are possible on the 
back of such a state intervention. So far, though, such state intervention has been deemed 
excessive, and no alliance has been created backing this alignment of state-SRM with emissions 
markets. 
In previous work, we used our analytical framework to speculate systematically about possible 
futures, resulting from plausible co-evolutions of a political regime with promises of climate 
engineering as a technical fix to climate change. We sought to assess what evidence there was for 
each. Looking back, those scenarios already need updating, which tells us something about the 
turbulence of the current moment (just after the election of Trump, the Brexit referendum, etc.), 
and the unfolding evolution of both the current political regime and climate engineering, which may 
be going through a moment of radical rapid change. A key rationale for writing this chapter is the 
illiberal tendencies of recent times and their challenge of the incumbent neoliberal regime (e.g. 
Economist 2018a), but we are well aware that the future is more radically open-ended than that 
dichotomy suggests. In the following section, we will first elaborate on the range of scenarios, to 
show some of the variety of multiple futures that are possible for co-evolving climate engineering 






3. Future scenarios  
Here we identify three distinct scenarios: (1) a continued neoliberal regime, (2) an illiberal regime 
and (3) an emergent ‘liberalism 2.0’ centred on China. These may be succinctly distinguished in 
terms of which fractions of global capital are dominant in each case (e.g. Gill and Law 1989, 
Robinson and Harris 2000).  In the neoliberal regime, globalised finance capital continues to 
dominate productive capital (both the automobile, consumer electrics etc. fraction underpinning US 
hegemony, now also globalised, and the more recently emerging digital economy). The illiberal 
scenario entails a retrenchment of the domination of finance capital, but now firmly dependent 
upon illiberal state power – in a new (un)Holy Alliance –, and hence divided up into national factions 
that incubate a global geopolitical context of tension and possibly conflict. Here, then, US global 
dominance is even more flagrantly a situation of sheer ‘domination’, not even clothed in the velvet 
glove of ‘hegemony’ (Arrighi 1995).  In the liberalism 2.0 scenario, a new productive capital fraction 
based on the digital economy takes centre stage, with China, where many of these businesses are 
already in evidence, as a new hegemon. 
For each scenario, we will discuss both the potential evolution of the political regime and speculate 
about the fate of climate engineering (as promise and as implementation). We draw on our 
analytical framework for the co-evolution of technical fix promises and political regimes and our 
previous work on the history of neoliberalism and climate engineering. To demonstrate how each 
scenario might evolve from tendencies in the current turbulent state of affairs, we will also mobilise 
supporting evidence about the current situation for each scenario. The time frame envisioned for 
the scenarios to unfold is 15-30 years.  
 
(1) Continued Neoliberal Regime  
It is possible that the current drama around Trump and Brexit ends up being only a minor upheaval 
that neoliberalism takes in its stride. In the US, Trump’s private economic interests may come to 
override his right-wing-populist political positioning (Faber et al 2017). Several commentators 
suggest that his politics, especially domestically, is in fact predominantly neoliberal, with, crucially, a 
friendly relationship to Wall Street and the financial sector (Hutton 2017, Palley 2017). To the extent 
that Trump himself actually leads an administration of untrammelled Republican dominance, were 
he to be removed from office, a Pence administration may also shed some of the more outrageous 
populism and double down on just such a renewed and newly ruthless neoliberal agenda. This would 
involve a frank celebration of inequality but where the very Prometheanism of such ‘winner-takes-
all’ competition turns out itself to elicit breakthroughs to big new horizons of profitable investment – 
profiting from, not just in spite of, the current political and environmental turbulence – that enable a 
new wave of economic growth that relieves and/or distracts from populist grievance somewhat. For 
instance, in the UK, key industrial sectors, including finance, may well find ways to profit even from 
Brexit, and help sustain the neoliberal political regime (Jessop 2017).  
In this scenario, neoliberalism survives the current nationalist, protectionist challenge, resulting in 
renewed commitment to free trade and continued globalised financialisation of the economy. Since 
the last couple of decades have also seen spectacular growth across most of the world, with the only 
clear winners being the working and middle classes of the global North, global appetite for such a 
regime is also eminently plausible. De-regulation and privatisation thus continue to be priorities, and 
market instruments continue to be seen as the solution for any issues by intra-national elites across 
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the world.  The ‘success’ of a further kickstart in economic growth would also serve to vindicate, and 
so strengthen, core neoliberal beliefs in the limitless primacy of market-based entrepreneurialism; 
which would, in turn, feed into a rejuvenated positive feedback loop between fossil fuels, especially 
oil and gas, and (belief in) unlimited growth(Mitchell 2011, Tyfield 2014).  Meanwhile, international 
commitments to climate change policy would likely evolve, but remain ineffective and insufficient. 
In light of the history of the co-evolution of neoliberalism with the promises of climate engineering, 
with this scenario we would expect continued non-implementation of climate engineering. The 
carbon price signal would remain weak, and current promises remain stable for some time, with 
continued interest in CDR technology, and CCS rumbling along weakly in the background. SRM would 
most likely remain out of bounds, beyond perhaps some limited research, but a resurgent 
concentration of power in neoliberal hands could in time reopen exploration of this possibility too, 
now able to sweep objections aside. As this could, in turn, further concentrate forms of economic 
and environmental power, particularly in terms of opportunities for private profit-making from the 
privatization of climate engineering initiatives perhaps initially introduced at state level, this could 
also set up new positive feedback loops of deepening co-production with a rampant neoliberalism 
2.0. Key to such a scenario, however, would be the re-emergence of new dynamics through which 
finance capital would once again be able to profit from, and so be progressively unified and 
empowered by, the growth of markets, market-based technologies and technological fixes, and the 
problems they themselves instigate.  
How this scenario may play out in the longer-term, as the climate crisis – or, indeed, the instability of 
the global economic system through ever-deeper financialisation and concentration of wealth – 
escalates and puts pressure on the regime, is unclear. As climate impacts worsen, the regime will 
probably face escalating carbon prices. Yet whether or not these are fundamentally destabilising or 
simply feed further neoliberalisation would depend on just how effective (global) neoliberal forces 
have been in further concentrating power in their hands in the meantime. After all, neoliberalism 
has weathered many seemingly ‘fundamental’ destabilizations over the last few decades, precisely 
insofar as it can invert such conjunctures into opportunities for profit.  If successful, then, high prices 
could conceivably be readily accommodated by the wealthy (both individuals and corporations) 
while simply forcing the costs on others who cannot afford them but have inadequate resources to 
resist further worsening of their situation; i.e. a further exacerbation of inequality that may be 
troubling in itself, but is not per se for neoliberalism. Here, then, a neoliberal ‘solution’ to climate 
change may even ultimately emerge (as discussed above), but at the cost of ever-worsening 
economic and political inequality. In this scenario, we could see implementation of climate 
engineering technologies. 
 
(2) Illiberalism  
Another possible scenario emerges from the possibility that the illiberal tendencies of increasing 
numbers of national leaders go unchecked. Their appeals to nationalism and strong leadership leads 
to continued high levels of right-wing populist support for narrowly focused, nationalistic policies 
(McDougall 2016, Faber et al 2017) emboldening the illiberal elements of the Trump administration 
– or, again, the Republican government that would remain in place and accountable to its angry 
populist base even where Trump himself is removed from office. Here we could imagine a sustained 
and successful strategic effort to weaken and conquer the judicial and legislative branches of 
government on top of the all-out assault on administrative arms of government working in the 
‘public interest’ or for social welfare, notably environment, energy, science and education.  
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In this scenario, and in contrast to the neoliberal regime, the governance epistemology is not that of 
a market, but that of a dictatorship characterized by fear, nepotism and corrupt networks of 
personal enrichment playing out a populist politics of anti-‘liberal’ outrage. The market is tolerated 
and perhaps even celebrated in discourse, at least domestically, but in practice market liberalism is 
only allowed when it does not challenge the leader’s fancies, family and friends. It must be noted, of 
course, as flagged above in terms of the ‘bastard offspring’, that this is in a sense an extension of 
neoliberalism which has long concentrated power in individuals and corporations (and networks 
thereof) under its banner of freeing the supposedly impersonal and disinterested market (Crouch 
2011). Notwithstanding this important continuity, however, the flagrant abuse of power and 
whipping up of socio-cultural division and animosity marks an important discontinuity and difference 
in this scenario to that just considered above. 
The utter dominance of finance capital over productive capital is here broken, but primarily due to 
the weakening of the former, weighed down and split by its own internal contradictions, not the 
strengthening of the latter.  Instead, a third actor, namely the nation-state, steps in to fill the power 
void.  In particular, a novel coalition emerges between illiberal forces, taking the reins of state 
power, and the sympathetic elements amongst the existing powers of a now-threatened financial 
elite. This coalition drives a programme that aims to preserve its privileged status amidst the 
disintegration of the neoliberal order through systematic dissimulation, concealing its elite, self-
serving agenda beneath a banner of populist grievance and the sowing of division.   
Such an approach would include the promise of reviving industries, and associated fractions of 
productive capital, from an erstwhile heyday (e.g. of US hegemony, but consider also Russia or 
Turkey etc…). Globalisation would also be rolled-back, and national capital factions strengthened. 
Industry serving the military (a key priority, connecting concentrated authoritarian power and 
populist jingoism) or providing means of popular surveillance provides stable jobs, possibly alongside 
construction and realty sectors benefitting from large infrastructure investments in which the 
populist leadership are themselves predominant creditors (Smith and Voss, 2016). We might even 
see re-shoring of industries (cf. Waldmeir, 2018).  Since there is already evidence of this 
development, what is key is the plausibility of a dynamic for its continuation over the medium-term: 
as deepening illiberalism in government action feeds greater turbulence, which both further 
challenges the capacity of finance capital to fashion the world in its preferred image while also 
offering multiple and growing openings for opportunistic profit-making (of the kind finance has 
perfected under neoliberalism), thence deepening the social and political crises that underpin 
further populist anger.  
All in all, it is less productive as a capitalist regime, although an initial investment boom may give it a 
temporary boost. In perhaps marked distinction to the continued neoliberal scenario, where the 
growth of renewables driven by corporations and market forces continues, here society deliberately 
and defiantly still runs on fossil fuels, potentially with an added renaissance for centralising nuclear 
power. Trump’s defence of the coal industry and coal jobs (Clouse 2016, Schwartz 2017) leads to 
some resurgence in coal mining and use in the US, while all ‘unconventional’ sources of oil and gas 
are developed, regardless of environmental impact or even the economics of a ‘business case’. The 
powerful global influence of the Trump administration through the enduring levers of US power, 
including dollar seignorage and unrivalled military firepower, conditions parallel unravelling of liberal 
democracies throughout the world, not least through support (whether moral, as exemplar or more 
actively engaged) for insurgent populisms within these countries as well.  
This illiberal scenario appears compatible with the evolution of multiple different outcomes for 
climate engineering. Defence of coal may evolve alongside continued, successful denial of climate 
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change, and therefore little reason to support climate engineering. But, under an illiberal regime, 
there is also scope for autocratic use of climate engineering, especially SRM. The centralising quality 
of some SRM technologies has reasonably made many observers wary of their democratic 
consequences (e.g. Macnaghten and Szerszynski 2013), and there have been warnings that climate 
engineering with global consequences could be undertaken not through international cooperation 
but by single actors. Victor (2008) warned that a wealthy ‘greenfinger’ person could deploy some 
climate engineering technologies. Clearly, an autocratic leader of a rich nation could unilaterally 
deploy SRM technology. 
An unaccountable, unreliable ‘strong leader’ could deploy SRM on a whim, but deployment could 
also be quite strategic. SRM could be justified by a leader or a group of leaders as a means to 
benevolently reduce the suffering of some of the world’s most vulnerable people. However, in 
practice, controlling the distribution of climate impacts is surely going to be extremely challenging, 
perhaps impossible, and would come with a serious risk of leading to international conflict. The 
military potential of SRM technology (Fleming 2010) might also be attractive to a unilateralist 
nationalist leader, backed by a strong military industry. Climate emergency might be invoked as an 
excuse for developing weaponised climate engineering technology, and could have the added 
benefit of projecting an image of strong leadership befitting a populist leader, feeding populist 
opinion, fear and support on which such a regime would depend. Climate engineering technology 
may also be used for domestic weather controlling reasons, but if so it is likely to spill over into 
regional conflict, and so again have military implications. The decision to take unilateral national 
climate engineering action here thus correlates with a growing geopolitical climate of great power 
tension and bluster, as only such military powers would (believe they) have the capacity to ignore 
global pressure to consider implications on other countries. Yet, conversely, amidst growing lack of 
global cooperation (including on climate change) and heightening geopolitical antagonisms 
(exacerbated by worsening differential climate change impacts), unilateral (and possibly 
weaponised) climate engineering becomes more likely. 
 
(3) Liberalism 2.0  
The election of Trump may also signify the descent of the US as hegemon. Trump’s promises to 
make the US as strong as it once was, as in his campaign slogan to “Make America Great Again”, can 
be interpreted as widespread popular recognition, not least in the US itself, that its global reign is 
weakening. The phenomenal growth and current size of the Chinese economy, including in emerging 
digital and knowledge economy sectors, suggests that Chinese ascendancy and the Chinese capitalist 
regime are critical determinants in the future world order (e.g. McNally et al. 2013, Tyfield 2017a, cf. 
Hung 2016, Fenby 2016). Trump’s early foreign policy has been erratic, but he repeatedly denounced 
China in his presidential campaign regarding its negative economic impact on the US and clashes 
with China have already emerged, notwithstanding attempts to court the Chinese President Xi 
Jinping. This may reflect friction in the process of global realignment.  
Tyfield (2014, 2017a) has discussed the possibility of a qualitatively novel future liberal regime, 
centred on China, that marks a different combination of continuities and discontinuities from the 
neoliberal regime to those of the other two scenarios above. This involves the turbulent emergence 
of a revitalized regime of the classical laissez faire liberalism, but refitted for the age of wicked 
problems and complex systems (and sciences thereof) – including, of course, climate change itself – 
as against the overweening epistemic confidence and belief in ‘Progress’ of its first incarnation in 
early 19th century Britain. Like classical liberalism, then, this ‘liberalism 2.0’ or ‘complexity liberalism’ 
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is characterised by the primacy of individualised negative liberty and a continuing privileging of 
markets, marking a distinct continuity with the waning neoliberal dominance of the present.  
Like the power regime of classical liberalism, it is also characterised by and fuelled by a dynamic of 
essential contestation. Here embryonic political economic and sociotechnical disruptions (in the 19th 
century the industrial revolution, today digitization) unsettle previously stabilized political 
allegiances, producing a political landscape of fragmentation and new polarization. This feeds a 
relatively lawless growth of the new capitalist economy while the political turbulence and newly 
vocal ‘extremes’ forge a qualitatively new political spectrum. This, in turn, constructs a new 
‘reasonable’ political middle of ‘liberal’ opinion, based on the increasingly empowered winners in 
this new world of the emergent bourgeoisie of this new capitalist economy. In short, then, under 
continuing and relatively unchallenged conditions of capitalist political economy, deepening political 
turbulence serves only to constitute and empower a new and specifically liberal capitalist historic 
bloc, even as the reins of government may veer wildly to the political extremes along the way. 
But there are also important differences to both of these earlier regimes. As against classical 
liberalism, it is no longer the sovereign individual that stands at the core of this social ontology but 
the intersubjectively dependent and suggestible networked individual, situated within and 
constitutive of contemporary complex socio-technical systems increasingly mediated by digital 
technologies. Understanding of these complex systems, and their potentially turbulent and/or 
sudden shifts and dynamic disequilibria, thus emerges as the epistemic (and tacitly normative) basis 
for the argument of the prima facie superiority of unleashing market forces.   
But, conversely, rebasing the argument for the market in a new-found body of thought also sets this 
regime directly against neoliberalism. For this move deposes markets per se from their foundational 
(and fundamentalist) centrality and re-establishes politically and scientifically compelling arguments 
regarding not only the possibility that markets may fail in certain instances, but also the offer of 
guidance on how they may then be fixed. In particular, this then enables a resurgent argument in 
favour of (possibly ‘strong’) states rectifying market failures, perhaps through strong regulatory 
intervention and public ownership of infrastructure. Certainly, government and the state itself 
thereby receive a renewed legitimacy and mission, in terms of being the agency responsible for 
managing the stability and resilience of the ‘system’ (at whatever territorial scale) as a whole. 
Clearly, this could readily enable a renewed and newly legitimate project of public investment in 
energy and environment, and innovation and infrastructure related thereto, that has been a singular 
and deliberate absence throughout the neoliberal period.   
What is most important about this putative future regime, however, is that this is not merely an 
abstract speculative possibility, but rather one that emerges from a reading of the ongoing evolution 
of socio-technical and political change within the presumptive heir apparent for global capitalist 
hegemony, namely China (Tyfield 2017a). While many pieces of the puzzle remain embryonic or 
even absent, such is the dynamism in China across the gamut of issues related to questions of the 
parallel development of political economic regime (national, local and, indeed, global) and 
innovation – and especially regarding issues of energy and environment, and particularly in the key 
space of emerging digital innovations in both of these domains – that betting against significant 
qualitative change in Chinese society and politics in the medium-term seems almost the bigger risk.  
Moreover, many of the key elements of this emergent regime are clearly in place and fast 
developing. For instance, in contemporary China we find a singularly dynamic participative, if 
pragmatic, social media-based public emerging, concentrated in a buoyant and rising urban ‘middle 
class’ and its production-side equivalent of a surging private sector economy, including in digital and 
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knowledge economy service sectors. This group also take environmental risks (increasingly including 
climate change) extremely seriously as day-to-day lived matters of ontological security.  
Such concerns, however, and their empowerment with the ascendancy of this power bloc on both 
national and global stages, do not augur a new universalistic concern with ‘saving the planet’ in 
China. Rather, the parallel and interdependent emergence of both concerted efforts on such issues 
and this particular constituency most likely suggest that dealing with environmental challenges will 
unfold in ways that systematically privilege the concerns of this emergent socio-political 
constituency, while neglecting the more numerous majority who remain disproportionately exposed 
to the risks and dangers of environmental change.  
This is thus a systematically duplicitous regime, in which a gloss of environmental and 
entrepreneurial virtue enables and is enabled by continuing socio-economic inequalities – again, just 
as the 19th century gospel of liberal ‘progress’ was co-produced with the development of the regime 
of industrial capitalism and its unprecedented Dickensian inequalities at home and creeping 
imperialism abroad. Symptomatic here would be the growth of a narrative of China as ‘green 
saviour’, highlighting its world-leading environmental regulation and investment in renewables, 
while occluding its continued reliance on and investment in fossil fuels, including coal, both 
domestically and, through its massive investment programme of ‘One Belt, One Road’, overseas 
(Walker 2016; Haas 2017; Hao 2017).  
In this scenario, then, at least a credible ‘patch’ of climate engineering technology would be needed, 
as promise and deployment, while China’s already established leadership in production of renewable 
energy technologies would suggest climate engineering may also become strongly advocated and 
pursued without reference to fossil fuels. The current remaining interest in fossil CCS and the 
growing interest in (some) CDRs may thus here be taken up (cf. Weng and Chen 2014) and the 
technologies developed and implemented to some extent driven by regulation. SRM seems a more 
distant prospect, but also not inconceivable.  
On the one hand, with little interest or expertise in China on SRM evident to date (though see 
Temple 2017), and with the singular sensitivity to the Chinese government of issues of national 
sovereignty – issues raised by SRM – there is evidence that China will be reluctant to pursue this 
technology, seeing it as too dangerous and prone to lead to international conflict (Moore et al 2016). 
Though more of a stretch, some have also argued that Chinese policy and diplomacy is structurally 
and/or culturally disinclined either to take the lead in such a hugely controversial global experiment 
or to play with the ‘human-nature’ balance with such seeming recklessness. Yet some of these same 
reasons also suggest that, while not taking a unilateral lead in pursuing SRM, China could emerge as 
a crucial mediator and negotiator in constructing global experiments and regulations that allow such 
development and deployment to take place.  
Here, in other words, by stressing the break with neoliberal US unilateral dominance that it 
represents – manifest in both its approach to regulation of climate engineering and in its ‘leadership’ 
on climate matters and ‘green technologies’ – China may yet construct new political feedback loops 
in which development of SRM, with China as primus inter pares, serves to boost its global (and 
domestic) political standing precisely as ‘green saviour’ and responsible global custodian. In this 
scenario, then, climate engineering (including SRM) may be developed in ways that explicitly 
distance these technologies from the case for continued fossil fuel use with which they were 
associated under neoliberalism – perhaps helpfully occluding the continued investment in fossil fuel 
infrastructures by China in the meantime. As the climate crisis deepens, the uptake of climate 
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engineering as discussed above becomes more likely, especially if the impacts are felt strongly in 
China. 
 
4. The contemporary hinge  
The three future scenarios above extrapolate observable tendencies in the current situation. Taken 
together, the scenarios show that the current moment holds the potential for co-evolution of the 
political regime and climate engineering into different possible futures. This is not surprising, but we 
can use the specifics of the scenarios to shed light on the structure of the current turbulence, by 
exploring the relations between the observed tendencies. We are not arguing that the scenarios are 
the given trajectories, the paths that must be chosen amongst, in a predictive mode analysis – and 
so we are not seeking to identify choice points. Rather, we discuss relations between scenarios – and 
the capital fractions dominant in each – as a way of identifying important dialectical tensions in the 
current moment, and their impact on climate engineering. We use the continued neoliberal scenario 
as a default or baseline, and discuss its relations with the two other scenarios presented above. 
 
(a) Neoliberalism – Illiberalism 
As discussed above, Trump (alongside Brexit Italy’s populist coalition, Alternativ für Deutschland, Le 
Pen, etc…) can be read as an (immanent) illiberal challenge to the neoliberal regime, but the latter 
has not simply disappeared or disintegrated. We still see a strongly financialised economy, fuelled by 
growth in consumer debt (Federal Reserve 2017), with Wall Street influence thus undiminished, i.e. 
a globalised financial capital faction sustaining US hegemony. The neoliberal regime has also seen 
the birth of and been sustained by strong growth in ICT giants in Silicon Valley and beyond, getting 
credit from Wall Street, generating a new generation of tech billionaires (Smith and Voss 2016, 
Economist 2017) albeit one still thoroughly saturated with the mores, expectations and power 
relations of neoliberal (venture) finance. The underpinning server infrastructure is fuelled mainly by 
fossil fuels – lately, increasingly with natural gas. The neoliberal regime has shaped the policies of 
both the main political parties in the US. However, we now also see some industry support for the 
Trump administration, with its often illiberal policies (Economist 2018b). This is no doubt in part 
driven by a hope for further deregulation, tax cuts and privatisation, for example in the climate 
policy arena. We can thus see a tension between neoliberal and illiberal futures. 
Neoliberal climate policy has been shaped in the tension between climate denialism and climate 
activism (alongside nearly all of climate science). Whilst denialism has a far stronger presence in the 
Trump administration than it did in the Clinton and Obama ones, and in this sense an improved 
standing, there is still a broad coalition of actors in support of climate policy, including states, civil 
society organisations and parts of industry (Sapinski 2015, 2017, Smith 2017), and international 
pressure (especially after the Paris Agreement). 
Trump campaigned on leaving the UNFCC Paris Agreement, but the administration later wavered on 
this issue. Trump’s aides were split on the issue, as is the Republican Party (Milman 2017). Even 
some big coal companies argued for staying in, with a central argument being to retain a seat at the 
international climate policy negotiation table (and that their investment planning horizons are 
longer than a presidency) (Volcovici 2017). A strategy of staying in but doing very little was a possible 
outcome (Milman 2017), and would have been in line with neoliberal superficial climate policy, even 
though the Trump administration finally decided to withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement. 
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Uncertainty over US climate policy is affecting the perceived prospects of climate engineering. There 
is speculation that if Trump can’t fight off climate policy as an issue, the potentially cheap fix of SRM 
may start looking attractive to the administration (Porter 2017, Bajak 2017), and likely rather more 
attractive than expensive CCS facilities that would add to costs of using coal (and gas). Prominent 
climate engineering researchers have stated, however, that they would not take funding from the 
administration and would counsel others to do likewise, with the argument to avoid the technology 
being associated with the denialist elements of the administration (Keith and Wagner, 2017; Keith, 
2017) (although others would say that is too late, e.g. ETC 2017).  
But, high-profile climate scientists have also warned that Trump rolling back climate change policy 
may further undermine belief in the adequacy of current mitigation-oriented climate policies, and in 
turn strengthen the case for (at least researching) climate engineering (Neslen 2017, Porter 2017), 
which would then have to be funded by others. It is worth noting that the Gates Foundation will 
likely fund a new, Harvard-based research programme on climate engineering (Keith and Wagner 
2017; Neslen 2017), alongside other foundations. An editorial in the San Diego Union-Tribune (2017) 
went so far as to say that “We call on one or more of the nation’s benevolent billionaires to consider 
privately funding a massive endeavour on the scale of the Manhattan Project to try to geoengineer 
such a hedge”.  
Key industries of the neoliberal regime, on Wall Street and beyond, may opt to support climate 
engineering (at least research) independently of the federal government. This has already happened, 
but may now ironically get a boost by fears of illiberal denialism (justified with reference to the coal 
industry amongst others). If, on the other hand, the Trump administration were forced to side with 
neoliberalism and rejuvenate its climate policy, then it may be tempted to support climate 
engineering research as a useful promise of a cheap, apparently non-disruptive technical fix. We may 
even see parallel, competing efforts of the administration and private actors.  
The current tension between neoliberalism and illiberalism creates new uncertainty for climate 
policy, but climate engineering may come out of it rather well. The promise of climate engineering 
may be useful for powerful actors, both neoliberal and populist, as long as these tensions remain, 
and support for climate engineering research may reap the benefits of this.  
(b) Neoliberalism – Liberalism 2.0  
China has surpassed the US in terms of trade volume, but not yet GDP, and has as yet not the same 
global reach in terms of military, political or cultural influence. Clearly though, there is a geopolitical 
tension between the countries. Importantly, as set out above, a new Chinese hegemony might take 
the form not of neoliberalism (or illiberalism) but of liberalism 2.0 (Tyfield 2014, 2017a). The 
geopolitical tension is thus also a tension between political regimes. 
China appears to be taking climate change increasingly seriously. This is due in part to rising 
domestic concerns about pollution and environmental harms, and in support of a booming clean 
tech industry, but also as a way of projecting soft power internationally (Tyfield 2017b). We should 
remember though that the Chinese economy is strongly coal dependent, and that China exports 
large numbers of coal plants to other countries especially in its Asian regional neighbourhood 
(Walker 2016), which might mean China will not take a global leadership role on climate policy (Haas 
2017).  
This uncertainty over the relative positions of US and China globally, in general, and regarding 
climate policy in particular, has probably not had much effect on climate engineering prospects so 
far. But that could now be changing as Trump pulled the US out of the Paris Agreement giving China 
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an even better opportunity to challenge the US for climate policy leadership (Wu 2017) while 
President Xi has made repeated and explicit global statements to bolster China’s image as 
responsible global custodian. China might also want to exploit the rift between the US and Europe 
on climate (and possibly now even national security), and strengthen its collaboration with Europe 
on climate in order to bolster its own green credentials, and at the same time tie the continent 
closer economically and politically. 
Whilst there is a track record in China of weather modification (Guo and Zheng 2009; Lui 2017), and 
a recent national research programme on climate engineering (Cao et al 2015) and CCS research and 
demonstration, there seems to be little indication of support for SRM deployment. Hamilton (2013) 
has argued that climate stress could make Chinese people desperate, and a government under 
pressure might be tempted to deploy cheap SRM in response. However, several commentators see 
minimal likelihood of Chinese unilateral SRM deployment due to the lack of any significant 
constituency advocating for it, coupled with the incompatability of SRM deployment with China’s 
strong protection of sovereignty as a principle in international relations (Edney and Symons 2014; 
Wend and Chen 2014).  
If China wants to demonstrate its commitment to climate mitigation, increased support for CCS or 
CDR technologies seem more likely. This would also seem to be most straightforwardly compatible 
with a future liberalism 2.0 in terms of somewhat stronger reliance on governmental nature 
stewardship and regulation limiting the worst excesses of markets and private action and through 
action by (networks of) private business and/or civil society actors (e.g. energy companies doing CCS 
or activists and NGOs running afforestation projects, albeit perhaps in both cases in the context of 
considerable governmental carrots and sticks). Such a model of fiercely competitive and 
experimental private enterprise taking the lead in constructing new technological capabilities and 
sectors on the basis of even vague and uncertain policy promises of the uniquely massive support of 
the Chinese central government is certainly already evident in other, cognate sectors, such as solar 
thermal or concentrated solar power (Gossens 2018). Conversely, at least insofar as it is imagined as 
a unilateral and radically self-interested technical fix, such complexity liberalism would seem to fit 
poorly with SRM deployment. 
If China continues to challenge the US in terms of global climate policy leadership, as part of a wider 
challenge for global influence, it will become increasingly difficult for US denialists to roll back US 
climate commitments internationally and domestically. For US neoliberals, this is an argument for 
continued market-based climate policy propped up by CCS and CDR promises, legitimized by 
research. For US illiberals, this situation might make climate engineering promises more appealing 
too, and they may support SRM more willingly. 
In the tension between a continued, but threatened, neoliberal regime and a budding liberalism 2.0, 
we can also see a dynamic that might benefit climate engineering (possibly framed as against fossil 
fuel use). In the short term, we might expect to see research and maybe even some deployment as 
an embryonic liberal 2.0 regime logic argues, perhaps not unpersuasively, for the need to explore ‘all 
options’ to reduce the potentially catastrophic effects of global warming as a position of 
responsibility and responsiveness to the climate emergency, not its denial or technical fix. This 
would thus involve rhetorical strategies to distance development of climate engineering from 
programmes that seek to deploy it either so as to allow unmitigated growth of fossil fuel 
consumption (as per the illiberal scenario) or to buy indefinite time for the market to solve the 
challenge of emissions and to enable marketization of the climate (as in the neoliberal one). Instead 
a liberal 2.0 climate engineering would seek to wed itself firmly in the public imagination with 
tackling climate change and decarbonisation, and with doing so ‘responsibly’, hence balancing the 
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dangers of developing and not developing climate engineering capacities, deploying and regulating it 
multilaterally etc. For now, this approach would likely benefit CCS and CDR most, but SRM may also 
emerge, reframed as explicitly constrained (as discussed above), as a focus of such ‘responsible’ 
experimentation (e.g. Keith 2017, Low 2017).  
Finally, perhaps bringing all three scenarios together, legitimacy of experimentation and advancing 
these technological options must be considered (Frumhoff & Stephens 2018). A new language and 
promise of ‘responsible’ experimentation with climate engineering may well be motivated precisely 
by the worsening crisis of populism, its environmental irresponsibility, its political economic 
incompetence and the social, political, economic and financial instability it fuels. Here, then, such a 
dialectical inversion would suggest that development along the illiberal trajectory may fuel 
emergence of the China-centred liberal 2.0 scenario, but not vice versa. For the latter would move 
progressively towards meaningful action on climate change (benefitting at least a powerful ‘some’) 
that would serve to release some of the dissatisfaction fuelling the populist surge, while the 
essentially nihilistic force of populism can lead only to further grievance, division and self-
destruction.  
 
5. Conclusion  
This chapter has explored the impact and significance of Trump (as an indicator of and shorthand for 
a wider process of geopolitical change in the form of a chauvinistic populism of political economic 
retrenchment) regarding the co-evolution of political regimes with promises of technical fixes to the 
problem of global climate change. Three radically different but possible future scenarios were 
described and tensions among possible futures created a lens for interpreting the current moment. 
We identified two key dialectics, between neoliberalism and illiberalism, and between continued 
neoliberal (but illiberally challenged) US hegemony and budding China-centred liberalism 2.0 (and 
the dominant fractions of capital corresponding to each of these regimes). Both these dialectics 
appear conducive to prolonged attention to the climate engineering promise, whether as talk, 
research, or limited deployment. In a nutshell, whilst continued neoliberalism in the US and 
elsewhere may lead to government support for cheap-seeming climate engineering, illiberal 
denialism may boost non-state neoliberal efforts to support climate engineering. And whilst China-
based liberalism 2.0 might lead to ‘responsible’ climate engineering efforts, even a continued US 
hegemony will be challenged by Chinese climate concern enough to justify US support for climate 
engineering as a fix. 
In our previous paper (Markusson et al 2017), we analysed how the multiplicity of climate 
engineering, as a promise of a technical fix to climate change, has mattered for its coevolution with 
the neoliberal political economy regime. In this chapter, with its prospectively oriented analysis, we 
are also discussing how a multiplicity of possible political economy regimes matters for that co-
evolution. We were prompted to think beyond just a continued unfolding of the neoliberal regime 
by the election of Trump, and we developed a method of systematically exploring our current 
predicament by juxtaposing different scenarios.  
Acknowledging turbulence in the current moment, we have sought to analyse emergent structures 
within that turbulence. This exploration does not presume scope for prediction, rather when we 
compare analysis from two years ago (Markusson et al 2017), we reflect on what recent events 
might mean for the possible co-evolutions of the political regime with climate engineering promises. 
Within the last two years, a newly realized illiberal challenge to the neoliberal regime has altered the 
 16 
 
prospects and pathways for climate engineering. The relative likelihood of the illiberal scenario vs. 
continued neoliberalism perhaps seems to have increased in the short-term. Although taking 
dialectical inversions and the turbulence of populist politics that are built into the former, this could 
be dramatically rebalanced in the opposite direction, e.g. given unforeseeable (possibly ‘black swan’) 
political ‘events’ that make Republican-led Congressional impeachment of Trump unavoidable. In 
any case, before we start mourning neoliberalism, it is important to acknowledge its insufficiency for 
promoting climate change action, at least at the scale and pace needed given the objective extent of 
this planetary emergency. Neoliberalism also undermined the very concept of a ‘public reason’, 
namely debate in the public sphere about matters of public good and accepted as, or at least held to 
account as, rational and based on empirical facts, favouring markets as epistemic arbiters. Trumpian 
post-truth is another aspect of how the populism for which he is current figurehead is the child of 
neoliberalism, and neoliberalism has now indelibly conditioned whatever comes next – whether it be 
a renewed invigorated neoliberalism or a new illiberal regime with autocratic rule. 
Recognizing that we are currently living through a time of instability and crisis, some may assume 
illiberalism may be imminent. This moment is, however, unique and unpredictable. Comparing this 
time to the 1930s crisis, and the rise of fascism in Europe, significant differences must be 
acknowledged. For starters, it should be noted that at least in the US it is the opponents, not 
supporters, of illiberal insurgency that currently master the mainstream media and that are on the 
streets en masse, whether in marches for climate, science or women. While excruciatingly 
frustrating and certainly not without significant future jeopardy, the US in 2017 continues to resist 
attempts to dismantle the rule of law and constitutional government in ways that Germany in 1933 
failed to. But another big difference concerns the deepening capitalist embrace and the sheer 
economic strength of China. In the area of climate policy, as we have argued above, a Trump regime 
rollback of US climate policy positions is also an opening for Chinese global positioning that the 
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party seems to be grasping with two hands.  
With the co-evolution of climate engineering advancement and political regimes, in the short-term 
we might continue to expect limited research and little implementation of CCS, CDR or SRM. We 
expect policy debate about CDR – especially BECCS – to continue, since many experts assume it is 
needed to halt the most dangerous climate scenarios that may provoke panic. However, the illiberal 
challenge to neoliberalism has now changed the game, and this exploratory consideration suggests 
that there may now be more support for climate engineering research rather than less. The illiberal 
boost of denialism is likely to spark growing attention to SRM, and we can expect ongoing 
controversy over this class of technologies in domestic and international discourse. Insofar as there 
is increased experimentation and deployment of climate engineering technologies, a variety of 
different forms of backlash might be expected, from diverse political agencies and positions, and 
with uncertain affect. Controversy regarding climate engineering as a promise of a technical fix to 
climate change is unlikely to disappear as long as the climate problem continues to worsen, as long 
as climate activists continue to resist, and as long as fossil interests are central to political regimes. 
Of course, the irony here is that this dynamic and resilient tumult of forces arraigned around the 
issue of climate engineering may also likely shape such developments as do happen in ways that 
could well make it increasingly palatable, and even positively attractive, for the great many who do 
not engage in any depth in climate engineering issues and politics, even as it remains always 
essentially contested – in ways that clearly resonate with the unfolding of a liberalism 2.0.  
Of course, other scenarios beyond the three articulated above are also possible.  Previously we 
explored a fourth scenario with a strongly participative, radically democratic climate engineering, 
with bottom-up, local engagement with the climate. This scenario would require a re-articulation of 
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both climate engineering and the climate change problem, and a focus on relatively low-tech and 
small-scale technologies. Martindale (2015) analyses Transition Town practices as potential 
democratic climate engineering, and here we have moved beyond what would currently be labelled 
technical fixes as such practices are typically not readily quantified and commodified (Lohmann 
2005). This kind of low-tech, localist ‘climate engineering’ would require a radically different political 
regime, with small scale, local orientation, governed by a Town Hall scale public reason, and would 
likely require definitive moves beyond capitalism to avoid centralisation and up-scaling, and enable 
local, communal forms of ownership to dominate. This scenario seems highly unlikely on the time 
scales we have discussed here.  
There are, however, also other progressive, if less utopian, visions in the literature. Olson sets out 
criteria for geoengineering variants that “touch gently on biological and social systems” (2012: p 30), 
leading him to focus on some technologies that can scale from the local to the regional. Similarly, 
Buck’s (2012) focus on participation leads her to focus on regional terrestrial climate engineering 
technologies, in explicit contrast to what globally central actors can do top-down for the world as a 
whole. These latter versions are less uncompromisingly utopian, plausible within a still-capitalist 
system, and therefore more easily promoted as elements of a progressive politics of resistance 
against, engagement with and socio-ecological transformation of the political regimes discussed 
above. There is an urgent need for further analysis of the potential role of socially progressive 
politics in the co-evolution of climate engineering and political economies. 
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